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Abstract
In this paper we adopt a Bayesian approach towards the estimation of the monetary policy
preference parameters in a general equilibrium framework. We start from the model presented by
Smets and Wouters (2003) for the euro area where, in the original set up, monetary policy
behaviour is described by an empirical Taylor rule. We abandon this way of representing monetary
policy behaviour and assume, instead, that monetary policy authorities optimize an intertemporal
quadratic loss function under commitment. We consider two alternative specifications for the loss
function. The first specification includes inflation, output gap and difference in the interest rate as
target variables. The second loss function includes an additional wage inflation target. The weights
assigned to the target variables in the loss functions, i.e. the preferences of monetary policy, are
estimated jointly with the structural parameters in the model. The results imply that inflation
variability remains the main concern of optimal monetary policy. In addition, interest rate smoothing
and the output gap appear to be, to a lesser extent, important target variables as well. Comparing
the marginal likelihood of the original Smets and Wouters (2003) model to our specification with
optimal monetary policy indicates that the latter performs only slightly worse. Since we are faced
with the time-inconsistency problem under commitment, we initialize our estimates by considering a
presample period of 40 quarters. This allows us to approach, empirically, the timeless perspective
framework.
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Correct knowledge of the variables that are of main concern for monetary policy is an important
asset since knowing the alternative monetary policy targets and their relative importance with
respect to each other will have an e⁄ect on the formation of private sector expectations. Given
the importance of these expectations and the role they play in stabilizing the economy, it is
desirable for monetary policy makers to provide the private agents with su¢ cient information
concerning the relative importance of each target variable. The value attached to a particular
target variable, for example the in￿ ation target, by monetary authorities can be described by
the relative weight assigned to this target in the loss function that the Central Bank aims to
minimize over the in￿nite horizon. The relative weights therefore generally re￿ ect the preferences
of monetary policy makers with respect to the corresponding target variables.
In order to infer the monetary policy preferences, one could analyze empirical monetary policy
reaction functions and study the behaviour of monetary policy makers. This kind of approach,
however, has often been criticised (Svensson, 2002a, 2003 and Dennis, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005 and
2006). The argument is based on the idea that, while an estimated reaction function gives a good
description of monetary policy behaviour, the intertemporal loss function is a more appropriate
measure of (changes in) monetary policy objectives. In the context of optimal monetary policy, a
reaction function is only a reduced form and results from a complex optimization problem of the
Central Bank. Hence the variables entering the reaction function mainly play a role in providing
monetary policy with information needed to achieve the policy objectives. These variables
are therefore not necessarily equal to the target variables that appear in the loss function and
cannot be attributed directly to the monetary policy objectives. In addition, the implied explicit
interest rate reaction function from the optimization problem under certain policy objectives will
typically contain more information by including the complete state vector, whereas a prespeci￿ed
estimated reaction function is restricted to respond to only a subset of the state variables. A
more theoretical justi￿cation for assuming a single representative monetary policy maker that
systematically optimizes an intertemporal loss function, as in Svensson (1999) and Woodford
(2003), is that this approach towards monetary policy will bring monetary policy behaviour in
line with the behaviour of private agents. Hence we adopt a general equilibrium framework
with rational and optimizing agents, where all structural equations result from optimal decisions
made by private agents as well as monetary policy makers. This framework would also make it
possible to detect changes in the monetary policy objectives over time and to derive the targeted
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1value of in￿ ation (Dennis, 2004).
An extensive amount of studies in the literature has recently focused attention on the estima-
tion or calibration of preferences of optimizing monetary policy authorities, which is analogous to
estimating the weights assigned to the target variables in the intertemporal optimization problem
of the Central Bank. Many of these estimation exercises in the context of forward-looking models
consider the case of discretionary monetary policy where optimization occurs every period and
private sector expectations are treated as constants, as in Dennis (2000, 2003), S￿derstr￿m et al.
(2003) and Castelnuovo (2004) for the US economy and Lippi and Neri (2005) for the euro area
economy1. The case of full commitment as in S￿derlind (1999) or commitment to a simple rule of
the kind adopted by Salemi (2001) for the US economy has, to our knowledge, not been applied
to the euro area economy. This is probably due to the time-inconsistency problem one has to
deal with under commitment. The aim of this paper is to study the case of monetary policy
that systematically minimizes an intertemporal quadratic loss function under full commitment
in a forward-looking model for the euro area. A commitment strategy, if credible, enables the
Central Bank to control the expectations of private agents and provides it with an additional
stabilization tool. We consider the Smets and Wouters (henceforth SW) (2003) model for the
euro area as the benchmark model, where we drop the estimated Taylor rule and replace it by
monetary policy that minimizes an intertemporal loss function under commitment subject to the
structural model of the economy. This enables us to estimate the preference parameters of the
monetary policy objective function jointly with the structural parameters of the model economy.
The estimations are performed using Bayesian methods, considering alternative forms of mone-
tary policy objective functions that di⁄er in their assumptions about the number and type of the
target variables. We use the values of the preference parameters obtained from the estimations
to derive the optimal Taylor rule within the benchmark SW (2003) model and look to which
extent the optimized feedback coe¢ cients di⁄er from the estimated coe¢ cients of the Taylor
rule in the original SW (2003) set up. In addition, we compare the results for the structural
parameters obtained from the modi￿ed model with optimal monetary policy to the results of the
original SW (2003) model, assigning di⁄erences to the alternative ways that monetary policy is
described. This comparison is based on the marginal likelihood values and impulse response
analysis. We make an attempt to overcome, empirically, the time-inconsistency problem that
comes along with optimization under commitment by considering an initialization period that is
1Dennis (2006) and Ozlale (2003) perform a similar exercise for the US in the context of the Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999) model, which is a purely backward-looking model and hence avoids time inconsistency issues.
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2long enough to reduce the e⁄ect of the initial values on the estimation results. This way, we are
able to implement the timeless perspective framework of Woodford (1999).
This paper is organized as follows. In the next part we outline the theoretical framework
adopted in this paper. We start from the SW (2003) model and describe the assumed structural
behaviour of the private agents in the economy, followed by the introduction of optimal monetary
policy, which leads to a set of Euler equations that can be estimated accordingly. In introducing
optimal monetary policy we consider two types of loss functions that appear to perform best
among a large set of alternative speci￿cations. The ￿rst loss function includes in￿ ation, the
model-consistent output gap and the interest rate di⁄erential as target variables, whereas the
second loss function considers an additional wage in￿ ation target. The third part explains the
methodology adopted and the data set used in the estimation procedure, followed by a discussion
of the results. We compare alternative models based on their marginal likelihood and discuss
the impulse responses obtained under the best performing model that is characterized by optimal
policy with respect to the benchmark impulse responses of SW (2003) in part four. In part ￿ve
we derive the unrestricted optimal commitment rule and the optimal coe¢ cients of the Taylor
rule, which we compare to the estimated Taylor rule of SW (2003). Accordingly, we refer to
the potential time-inconsistency problem due to our commitment framework and show how we
circumvent this issue by adopting the concept of timeless perspective policy of Woodford (1999)
in part six. Finally, part seven concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The structural behaviour of the euro area economy is assumed to be described by the model
developed by Smets and Wouters (2003). In this type of micro-founded framework private agents
base their individual decisions on optimizing behaviour. This results in aggregate structural
equations of which the parameters re￿ ect deep preferences of the agents. However, instead of
capturing the behaviour of the monetary policy authorities by an empirical Taylor rule as is
done in the original set up of the SW (2003) model, we will assume that monetary policy is
performed optimally under commitment. This will ensure that monetary authorities behave
more consistently and in analogy with the private agents2. Moreover, this approach will allow
us to estimate the preferences of monetary policy makers over the target variables. Following
the arguments outlined in e.g. Svensson ( 2002a, 2003), Dennis (2000, 2003) and Lippi and Neri
2An argument in this direction is also made by Svensson (2002a) in his discussion of the SW (2003) paper.
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3(2005)3, estimating the policy preferences rather than the monetary policy reaction function
is more desirable since the latter is only a function of the former. Describing the behaviour
of monetary policy authorities in terms of their preferences yields therefore more and better
information about their incentives underlying their actions in response to economic developments
than estimated interest rate reaction functions. In the following we present a brief summary of
the linearized SW (2003) model for the euro area and introduce the optimizing monetary policy
authorities. The resulting model, that takes into account optimal monetary policy behaviour
under commitment, can accordingly be estimated with euro area data. Our main intention is to
compare these results to those obtained under the original SW (2003) speci￿cation of the model.
2.1 The Smets and Wouters model for the Euro Area
The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework presented in SW (2003) for the
euro area consists of a household sector that supplies a di⁄erentiated type of labour, leading to
nominal rigidities in the labour markets. The goods markets are characterized by intermediate
and ￿nal goods producers. The former type of agents are monopolistically competitive and
produce a di⁄erentiated type of intermediate goods, leading to nominal rigidities in the goods
markets. The latter type of agents operate in a perfectly competitive market and produce one
￿nal good used for consumption and investment by the households.
Next to these nominal rigidities in the goods and labour markets, the model also features real
rigidities like habit formation, costs of adjustment in capital accumulation and variable capital
utilization. There are many similarities with the model presented in Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (CEE) (2001). However, the SW (2003) model includes an additional number of structural
shocks, partial indexation to past in￿ ation in the labour and the goods markets and is estimated
using (Bayesian) estimation methods. The linearized rational expectations equations that result
from private sector optimizing behaviour are summarized next, where the same notation as in
SW (2003) is adopted and where all variables are expressed as log deviations from their steady
state levels denoted by ^, i.e.
^
x = log
￿ x
x￿
￿
.4
The consumption Euler equation includes an external habit variable that leads to a backward-
3These studies assume, in contrast to our approach, that monetary policy is conducted under discretion. Lippi
and Neri (2005) also consider the euro area and incorporate the case of imperfect information in their estimation
procedures.
4For a detailed description of the individual parameters and the optimizing behaviour of the agents that lead
to the linearized version of the model, we refer to the original SW (2003) paper.
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4looking component to capture habit persistence:
^
Ct =
h
1 + h
^
Ct￿1 +
1
1 + h
Et
^
Ct+1 ￿
1 ￿ h
(1 + h)￿c
￿
^
Rt ￿ Et
^
￿t+1
￿
+
1 ￿ h
(1 + h)￿c
￿
^
"
b
t ￿ Et
^
"
b
t+1
￿
(1)
with
^
"
b
t an AR(1) preference shock to the discount rate with an i.i.d. normal error term. Nominal
wages are set by households according to a Calvo (1983) type of scheme. Households that cannot
reoptimize will adjust their nominal wages partially to past in￿ ation with a degree 0 ￿ ￿w ￿ 1,
leading to the following real wage equation:
^
wt =
￿
1 + ￿
Et
^
wt+1 +
1
1 + ￿
^
wt￿1 +
￿
1 + ￿
Et
^
￿t+1 ￿
1 + ￿￿w
1 + ￿
^
￿t +
￿w
1 + ￿
^
￿t￿1
￿
1
1 + ￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿w)(1 ￿ ￿w)
(
￿w+(1+￿w)￿L
￿w )￿w
￿
^
wt ￿ ￿L
^
Lt ￿
￿c
1 ￿ h
(
^
Ct ￿ h
^
Ct￿1) ￿
^
"
L
t ￿ ￿w
t
￿
(2)
where ￿w is a constant in ￿w;t = ￿w + ￿w
t with ￿w;t a shock to the wage mark-up assumed to
be i.i.d. normal around the constant term and
^
"
L
t a shock to labour supply assumed to follow
an AR(1) process with an i.i.d. normal error term. The investment equation, characterized by
adjustment costs depending on the size of investments, is described as follows:
^
It =
1
1 + ￿
^
It￿1 +
￿
1 + ￿
Et
^
It+1 +
’
1 + ￿
^
Qt +
￿Et
^
"
I
t+1 ￿
^
"
I
t
1 + ￿
(3)
with
^
"
I
t an AR(1) shock to investment costs with an i.i.d. normal error term. The real value
of capital is represented by:
^
Qt = ￿(
^
Rt ￿
^
￿t+1) +
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ +
￿
r
kEt
^
Qt+1 +
￿
r
k
1 ￿ ￿ +
￿
r
kEt
^
r
k
t+1 + ￿
Q
t (4)
with ￿
Q
t an i.i.d. normal shock that captures changes in the external ￿nance premium due to
informational frictions. The capital accumulation equation ful￿lls5:
^
Kt = (1 ￿ ￿)
^
Kt￿1 + ￿
^
It (5)
As in the case of wage setting by households, the intermediate goods producers set their prices
in line with Calvo (1983). Firms that are not able to reoptimize adjust their price partially to
past in￿ ation with a degree 0 ￿ ￿p ￿ 1, leading to the following New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
^
￿t =
￿
1 + ￿￿p
Et
^
￿t+1 +
￿p
1 + ￿￿p
^
￿t￿1 (6)
+
1
1 + ￿￿p
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿p
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿p
￿
￿p
￿
￿
^
r
k
t + (1 ￿ ￿)
^
wt ￿
^
"
a
t + ￿
p
t
￿
5Note that we correct for a typo in SW (2003) by replacing lagged investment by its current value. In
addition, we include in equation (8) the cost of capital adjustment component (last term) in the ￿rst line, which
is omitted in SW (2003).
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5where
^
"
a
t is an AR(1) productivity shock with i.i.d. normal error term. The ￿nal term in square
brackets represents the real marginal costs augmented with an i.i.d. (cost-push) shock ￿
p
t to the
mark-up in the goods market, i.e. ￿p;t = ￿p + ￿
p
t. The labour demand equation for a given
capital stock is given by:
^
Lt = ￿
^
wt + (1 + ￿)
^
r
k
t +
^
Kt￿1 (7)
Finally, the goods market equilibrium condition is represented by the following expression where
total output equals total demand for output by households and the government (￿rst line) and
total supply of output by the ￿rms (second line):
^
Yt = cy
^
Ct + gy"G
t + ￿ky
^
It +
￿
r
k
ky￿
^
r
k
t (8)
= ￿(
^
"
a
t + ￿
^
Kt + ￿￿
^
r
k
t + (1 ￿ ￿)
^
Lt)
where "G
t is an AR(1) government spending shock with i.i.d. normal error term.
In order to complete the model we introduce optimizing monetary policy authorities, discussed
in the next section, which distinguishes our model from the original SW (2003) speci￿cation where
monetary policy is described by a generalized empirical Taylor rule of the following type6:
^
Rt = ￿
^
Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
￿t + r￿(
^
￿t￿1 ￿
￿
￿t) + ry(
^
Yt￿1 ￿
^
Y
p
t￿1)
￿
(9)
+r￿￿(
^
￿t ￿
^
￿t￿1) + r￿y((
^
Yt ￿
^
Y
p
t ) ￿ (
^
Y t￿1 ￿
^
Y
p
t￿1)) + ￿R
t
where ￿ is the monetary authorities￿smoothing parameter and ￿R
t an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
In addition to the one-period di⁄erence in in￿ ation and the output gap, a gradual response to
lagged in￿ ation and lagged output gap is assumed. Since the main di⁄erence between the two
models is the way monetary policy is described, i.e. optimizing vs. empirical reaction function,
we will be able to attribute di⁄erences in estimation results under both models to the speci￿c
assumptions made about monetary policy behaviour7.
2.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
Monetary policy authorities are assumed to minimize a discounted intertemporal quadratic loss
function of the following type:
Et
1 X
i=0
￿
i[y0
t+iWyt+i], 0 < ￿ < 1 (10)
6Note that we correct a typo in SW (2003) in the ￿rst line of the rule where the lag of the output gap appears
instead of the current output gap.
7Note that we also do not include the in￿ation objective shock,
￿
￿t, in the model with optimal policy. This
shock does not play a signi￿cant role in the estimation outcomes of SW (2003).
7
6with ￿ the discount factor and Et the expectations operator conditional on information available
at time t. This type of quadratic loss function is commonly adopted in the literature, as in
Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), Giannoni and Woodford (2003), S￿derlind (1999) and Dennis
(2005). The vector yt = [x0
t u0
t]0 contains the n ￿ 1 endogenous variables and AR(1) exogenous
variables in the model included in xt and the p ￿ 1 vector of control variables included in ut.
Since we assume only one control variable, i.e. the interest rate, ut is in our case a scalar with
ut =
^
Rt. W is a time-invariant symmetric, positive semi-de￿nite matrix of policy weights
which re￿ ect the monetary policy preferences of the Central Bank over the target variables. An
alternative and theoretically more justi￿able approach towards monetary policy would be to
derive the approximated welfare based loss function, where the target variables and their weights
in the loss function are determined by the utility of the households. However, this is not an easy
task given the presence of variable capital utilization and investment dynamics in the model.
Therefore we will assume a quadratic ad hoc loss function in this study8.
We follow standard practice in the literature9 in assuming that the one-period ad hoc loss
function for (10) re￿ ects the fact that monetary policy targets in￿ ation, a measure of the output
gap and a smoothing component for the policy instrument which is described by the interest
rate:
Lt =
^
￿t
2
+ qy(
^
Yt ￿
^
Y
p
t )2 + qr(
^
Rt ￿
^
Rt￿1)2 (11)
As explained in the next part, the dataset used in the estimation procedure contains series
on (detrended) in￿ ation considered in deviation from its sample mean. Since we normalize
the in￿ ation target in (11) to zero, this implies that monetary policy aims to stabilize in￿ ation
around the sample mean. Hence the sample mean is considered to be the in￿ ation target,
which is a known constant10. The inclusion of the term
^
Rt ￿
^
Rt￿1 in the loss function, as in
Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003), can be justi￿ed by concerns
about ￿nancial stability or in order to take into account the observed inertial behaviour in the
policy instrument, which suggests a gradualist monetary policy approach11. The output gap
8See Onatski and Williams (2004) for an exercise on welfare based approximation to the loss function in the
SW (2003) model and Levin et al. (2005) for a similar study.
9See e.g. Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), Giannoni and Woodford (2003), Dennis (2003), S￿derstr￿m et al.
(2003), Lippi and Neri (2005) and Castelnuovo (2004).
10One could criticise this approach and alternatively consider the in￿ation target as an additional parameter
to be estimated. We would like to consider this apporach as an extension to this paper in the near future.
Conditions under which the in￿ation target can be identi￿ed and estimated are provided by Dennis (2003,2004).
11In our estimation exercises performed in the next part, we replace this ￿nal term by the interest rate level, i.e.
^
R
2
t, a case studied by e.g. Giannoni and Woodford (2002), Woodford (2003) and Onatski and Williams (2004).
The results in terms of marginal likelihood suggest that the data prefers the loss function speci￿cation of type
(11).
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7considered here is the one implied by the model, i.e. the deviation of output from its natural
level, the latter being the level of the output in total absence of nominal rigidities and the
three i.i.d. cost-push shocks (￿
Q
t ;￿
p
t;￿w
t )12. As is done in most applications in the literature,
the weight assigned to in￿ ation in the above loss function is normalized to one13. Hence the
weights corresponding to the output gap and the interest rate smoothing component, i.e. qy
and qr, respectively, are to be interpreted as relative weights with respect to the in￿ ation target
variable. We will estimate the preferences of monetary policy re￿ ected by these parameters
along with the structural parameters of the economy, which will provide us with values for the
weights in the loss function over the estimation period. These values will be accordingly used
in the optimal monetary policy evaluation exercises performed in part ￿ve.
Since the structural model of the economy outlined above is characterized by nominal wage
rigidities, it is appealing from a theoretical point of view to investigate also the case where
monetary policy is concerned about stabilizing nominal wage in￿ ation in addition to the target
variables in (11). A case for a nominal wage in￿ ation target is provided by Erceg et al. (1998,
1999) where, as in Kollmann (1997) and Woodford (2003), a dynamic general equilibrium model
featuring staggered wage and price setting is developed and where the authors show that rigidities
in these both markets at the same time make the Pareto optimal equilibrium unattainable for
monetary policy. Hence there is a tradeo⁄ between price, wage and output gap stabilization.
Moreover, Erceg et al. (1999) derive a social welfare function under the circumstances of nominal
wage and price rigidities and show that there are high welfare costs attached to targeting price
in￿ ation only and ignoring wage in￿ ation stabilization. In the welfare based loss function derived
for the SW (2003) model by Onatski and Williams (2004), a term for wage in￿ ation is also
included14. Therefore, we will analyze also the following alternative speci￿cation of the loss
function, where monetary policy aims to target nominal wage in￿ ation as well:
Lt =
^
￿t
2
+ qy(
^
Yt ￿
^
Y
p
t )2 + qr(
^
Rt ￿
^
Rt￿1)2 + qw(
^
Wt ￿
^
Wt￿1 +
^
￿t)2 (12)
12Although it is more common in empirical applications that deviations of output from a linear trend are
used as an approximation to the output gap, we prefer to adopt the theoretical concept of the output gap. To
support this choice, we experiment with alternative de￿nitions of the output gap in the next part which yield less
favourable results in terms of the marginal likelihood.
13Examples can be found in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), Dennis (2003)
and Woodford (2003).
14In addition, Onatski and Williams (2004) include a positive weight on the capital stock and the covariance
between in￿ation and wages. This results in an approximated loss function of the type Lt =
^
￿t
2
+ 0:21K2
t￿1 ￿
0:51
^
￿t
^
￿t￿1 + 0:24(
^
Wt +
^
￿t)(
^
Wt ￿
^
Wt￿1). We consider this speci￿cation also in the next part, where the
corresponding weights are estimated. The results however, which we do not report or analyze further, appear to
be worse than under (11) and (12). Moreover, we cannot provide an intuitive explanation for the inclusion of the
capital stock in the context of standard loss functions we wish to focus on in this study.
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8The speci￿cation of the one period loss function in (11) can be considered as a special case of (12)
where qw is set to 0. We will estimate the model under both speci￿cations of the loss function,
by treating the case under each one of the two speci￿cations as a separate model. Therefore, we
will refer to the case where qw = 0, i.e. period loss function (11), as model M1 and consider the
case where nominal wage in￿ ation is an additional target variable as model M2. We then use
the corresponding marginal likelihood values in order to rank the two models and assess to which
extent monetary policy has been concerned about nominal wage in￿ ation stabilization over the
sample period15.
The Central Bank minimizes the intertemporal loss function (10), the one-period loss function
of which is given by either (11) or (12), under commitment subject to the structual equations of
the economy (1) - (8) augmented by their ￿ exible price versions, written and represented by the
following second order form:
Axt = BEtxt+1 + Fxt￿1 + Gut + Dzt, zt ￿ iid[0;￿zz] (13)
with zt an n ￿ 1 vector of stochastic innovations to the variables in xt, having mean zero and
variance-covariance matrix ￿zz.
Under commitment the central bank optimizes only once in the initial period t0, ignoring
past promises but tying its hands by promising at t0 to follow the resulting policy rule forever16.
The resulting equilibrium is not time consistent and past commitments will be respected only in
the future periods to come after t0, therefore making policy history dependent only from t0 on.
This is re￿ ected by the presence of the Lagrange multipliers in the optimal reaction function17.
We follow the optimization routine for commitment suggested by Dennis (2005) where, in
contrast to e.g. S￿derlind (1999), no classi￿cation of the variables in a predetermined and a
non-predetermined block is needed. We further adopt the de￿nition of rational expectations as
proposed by Sims (2002), i.e.
Etxt+1 + ￿x
t+1 = xt+1 (14)
15We admit that in this study we make the strong assumption that the monetary policy regime has been
unchanged in the euro area throughout the sample period. This might be doubtful given the separate monetary
policy strategies adopted in the individual countries before the introduction of the Euro. However, the transition
period towards the Euro and the restrictions imposed by the Maastricht treaty justify our assumption that the
policy regimes were more likely to have been in line rather than divergent.
16Past promises are ignored by setting initial values of the Lagrange multipliers equal to zero.
17However, we will make an attempt to overcome this time-inconsistency problem in our estimation procedure,
by incorporating the philosophy of optimization from a timeless perspective of Woodford (2003). This boils down
to setting the initial values of the Lagrange multipliers of forward-looking variables to nonzero, which does lead
to a time consistent equilibrium.
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9and partition the matrix of weights W in (10) as follows:
Et
1 X
i=0
￿
i[x0
t+iQxt+i + u0
t+i￿ut+i]; 0 < ￿ < 1 (15)
where we express the loss function in terms of the variables xt and ut. Accordingly, we obtain
the Euler equations of the monetary policy optimization problem, which can be represented in
the following second order form:
A1￿￿t = B1￿Et￿t+1 + C1￿￿t￿1 + D1￿zt (16)
with:
A1￿ =
2
4
Q 0 A0
0 ￿ ￿G0
A ￿G 0
3
5 B1￿ =
2
4
0 0 ￿F0
0 0 0
B 0 0
3
5 (17)
C1￿ =
2
4
0 0 1
￿B0
0 0 0
F 0 0
3
5 D1￿ =
2
4
0
0
D
3
5 and ￿t =
2
4
xt
ut
￿t
3
5 =
￿
yt
￿t
￿
and the ￿nal term in ￿t, ￿t, the vector of Lagrange multipliers. It is clear from the system
of Euler equations (17) that the economy￿ s law of motion (13), which reappears in the last line
in (17), is augmented by the set of ￿rst order conditions with respect to xt and ut, through
which the (leads and lags of the) Lagrange multipliers ￿t enter into the system and the matrices
A1￿;B1￿;C1￿ have dimension (2n + p) ￿ (2n + p)18. In the next part, we will estimate the
Euler equations resulting from the optimization procedure outlined above, i.e. the system (16),
by applying Bayesian estimation techniques.
3 Estimation
In this part we discuss the dataset used and the methodology followed in estimating the system
(16), which yields estimates of the structural parameters resulting from optimizing private agents
and policy preferences of optimizing monetary policy authorities. Next, we present the results
under M1 and M2 and compare them to each other and to the estimates obtained from the
benchmark model in SW (2003).
3.1 Data
We use the same dataset as the one used by SW (2003) for the euro area, i.e. constructed
by Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001). The dataset contains observed series on real GDP, real
18A more detailed illustration of the state space expansion and the inclsuion of the leads and lags of the
Lagrange multipliers can be found in Juillard and Pelgrin (2005).
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10consumption, real investment, GDP de￿ ator, real wages, employment and the nominal interest
rate. The series range over the period 1980:2 - 1999:4, preceded by an initialization period of
40 quarters in order to initialize the estimates. The reason why we opt to end the observation
period in the last quarter of 1999 is for comparison of the estimation results to those obtained
under the original speci￿cation of the model in SW (2003), where monetary policy is assumed
to follow a generalized Taylor rule. Furthermore, as in SW (2003), all variables are considered
in deviations from their sample means. In￿ ation and nominal interest rates are detrended by
the in￿ ation trend, whereas the remaining variables in the dataset are detrended separately by a
linear trend. As explained in SW (2003), we introduce an additional equation for employment
to correct for the use of data on employment instead of the unobserved data on aggregate hours
worked in the euro area:
^
Et ￿
^
Et￿1 =
^
Et+1 ￿
^
Et +
(1 ￿ ￿￿e)(1 ￿ ￿e)
￿e
￿
^
Lt ￿
^
Et
￿
(18)
We further introduce an i.i.d. measurement error ￿R
t to take account for mismeasurement in the
observed series of the nominal interest rate (
^
R
obs
t ), leading to the following relation between the
observed and the non-observed policy instrument rate19:
^
R
obs
t =
^
R
nobs
t + ￿R
t (19)
As opposed to SW (2003), the two monetary policy shocks that appear in the generalized Taylor
rule, i.e. a shock to the in￿ ation objective and an interest rate shock, are absent from the models
M1 and M220. As in SW (2003), identi￿cation is obtained through the assumption that all
shocks are uncorrelated, that the three cost-push shocks together with the measurement error
follow a white noise process and that the remaining shocks related to preferences and technology
are AR(1). In order to compare our results to those obtained by SW (2003), we use the same
prior speci￿cations for those parameters that correspond to the parameters in the original model.
Therefore, we ￿x the following parameters: the discount factor ￿ is set equal to 0:99, implying
an annual real interest rate of 4 percent. The annual depreciation rate on capital is assumed to
be 10 percent, i.e. ￿ = 0:025. The income share of labour in total output is assumed to be 0:7
in the steady state, i.e. ￿ = 0:3. The share of consumption and investment in total output is
0:6 and 0:22 in the steady state, respectively. Finally, ￿w is calibrated to be 0:5, for reasons of
19This measurement error could be compared to a monetary policy shock, since it takes account for the observed
di⁄erence between the actual interest rate and the systematic movements in the interest rate as implied by the
model. Although the interpretation of this measurement error, in contrast to the monetary policy shock in the
original SW (2003) model, is not a structural one.
20As a result, we end up with nine shocks, instead of the original ten shocks.
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11identi￿cation. In the next section we outline the methodology adopted in the estimation of the
remaining parameters.
3.2 Methodology
We apply Bayesian estimation techniques in order to estimate the parameters of the alternative
models21. After solving for the linear rational expectations solution of the model in (16), we
derive the following state transition equation:
￿t = ￿Y ￿t￿1 + ￿zzt (20)
and the measurement equation that links the state variables ￿t linearly to the vector of observ-
ables ￿t,
￿t = ￿Y ￿t (21)
We use the Kalman ￿lter to calculate the likelihood function of the observables recursively, start-
ing from initial values of the state vector ￿0 = 0 and the unconditional variances22. Next, the
posterior density distribution is derived by combining the prior distribution with the likelihood
function obtained from the previous step. We proceed until the parameters that maximize the
posterior distribution are found, i.e. until convergence around the mode is achieved. After max-
imizing the posterior mode, we use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate draws from
the posterior distribution in order to approximate the moments of the distribution, calculate the
modi￿ed harmonic mean and construct the Bayesian impulse responses23. In discussing the es-
timation results, however, we will focus on the maximized posterior mode and the Hessian-based
standard errors.
In Table 1 the ￿rst three columns show the details of the prior distributions for the shock
processes, i.e. the standard errors ￿ of all nine shocks and the AR(1) coe¢ cients ￿ of the ￿ve
preference shocks. The type of the prior distributions, the prior means and the prior standard
errors are identical to the assumptions made in SW (2003) and are kept constant throughout
the estimation processes for both models M1 and M2. All variances of the shocks are assumed
to have an inverted gamma distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, except for the measurement
error which we assume to be gamma distributed with a prior mean of 0:05 and standard error of
21For a detailed discussion in favour of Bayesian estimation of DSGE models, we refer to SW (2003-2005),
Schorfheide (2006) and An and Schorfheide (2006).
22As discussed next, we experiment also with initial values at nonzero for certain lagrange multipliers in order
to incorporate the concept of optimal policy under the "timeless perspective".
23All estimations are performed using Michel Juillard￿ s software dynare, which can be downloaded from the
website www.dsge.net.
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120:025. The ￿ve AR(1) coe¢ cients are assumed to have a beta distribution with a prior mean of
0:85 and a strict prior standard error of 0:1 in order to distinguish the persistent shocks clearly
from the i.i.d. shocks. Table 1 also reports the results obtained from the posterior maximization,
i.e. the posterior mode and the (Hessian-based) standard errors for the models M1, M2 and
the original SW (2003) model. These results are discussed and compared in the next section.
The results for the structural parameters are reported in Table 2, together with the SW (2003)
results. The prior speci￿cations and the estimates of the monetary policy preference parameters,
i.e. the weights assigned to the target variables qy, qr and qw are reported in the bottom part of
the table. These parameters are assumed to be normally distributed with 0:5 prior mean and
0:2 prior standard error.
3.3 Results
As mentioned before, we report and discuss only the estimation results obtained for M1 and M2
because under these two types of the loss function highest marginal likelihoods were obtained24.
We also re-estimate the SW (2003) model25 which will serve as a benchmark for the results
obtained under models M1 and M2 with optimal monetary policy.
3.3.1 Structural Shocks and Private Sector Parameters
Turning to the results concerning the structural shocks reported in Table 1, the estimated pa-
rameters and their corresponding standard errors under our speci￿cation M1 of the model are
similar to those under M2. A few remarks are worth making when we compare the results under
both models to our estimates of the benchmark SW (2003) model. The estimates of the labour
supply shock ￿l and the equity premium shock ￿Q are considerably lower under the models M1
and M2, compared to SW (2003). In addition, the labour supply shock turns out to be more
persistent under M1 and M2 than under SW (2003). A higher persistence is also estimated for
the productivity shock. The wage mark-up shock ￿W is higher under M1 and M2 than the SW
(2003) estimate.
Comparing the SW (2003) estimates for the structural parameters to these obtained under
M1 and M2, which are reported in Table 2, yields the following conclusions. The investment
24In our experiments we consider alternative loss functions where we replace the interest rate smoothing term
by the interest rate level, or the output gap by the di⁄erences in output. We also studied the case where we
used simply output deviations from a linear trend instead of the model-consistent output gap. We examined loss
functions including a di⁄erence in the output gap, a di⁄erence in the in￿ation rate or of the welfare approximated
type presented by Onatski and Williams (2004) as well. None of these cases, however, could yield better outcomes
in terms of their corresponding marginal likelihoods.
25These results appear to be very similar to those reported in the original SW (2003). However, mainly due
to corrections for very small errors in the original version, the results are not identical.
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13Table 1: Prior speci￿cations and estimates of the shocks, with the standard errors followed by
the AR(1) coe¢ cients. Both speci￿cations are compared to the results obtained in SW (2003)
Parameter Prior Speci￿cation
Distribution Type Prior Mean Prior se
￿a productivity shock Inverse gamma 0:4 2
￿b preference shock Inverse gamma 0:2 2
￿G government spending shock Inverse gamma 0:3 2
￿l labour supply shock Inverse gamma 1 2
￿I investment shock Inverse gamma 0:1 2
￿Q equity premium shock Inverse gamma 0:4 2
￿P price mark-up shock Inverse gamma 0:15 2
￿W wage mark-up shock Inverse gamma 0:25 2
￿￿ in￿ ation objective shock (only SW (2003)) Inverse gamma 0:02 2
￿MP monetary policy shock (only SW (2003)) Inverse gamma 0:1 2
￿R measurement error (only M1 and M2) Gamma 0:05 0:025
￿￿ in￿ ation objective shock (only SW (2003)) Beta 0:85 0:1
￿a productivity shock Beta 0:85 0:1
￿b preference shock Beta 0:85 0:1
￿G government spending shock Beta 0:85 0:1
￿L labour supply shock Beta 0:85 0:1
￿I investment shock Beta 0:85 0:1
Results from Posterior Results from Posterior Results SW (2003)
Parameter Maximization M1 (qw = 0) Maximization M2 (qw 6= 0) (re-estimated)
Mode se (Hessian) Mode se (Hessian) Mode se (Hessian)
￿a 0:5252 0:0771 0:5366 0:0806 0:6051 0:1097
￿b 0:2031 0:0475 0:1909 0:0465 0:2577 0:0805
￿G 0:3236 0:0256 0:3234 0:0255 0:3225 0:0254
￿l 1:8033 0:3533 1:8406 0:3629 4:1880 1:4832
￿I 0:0498 0:0159 0:0523 0:0174 0:0639 0:0177
￿Q 0:4907 0:0602 0:4862 0:0615 0:5984 0:0594
￿P 0:1595 0:0152 0:1578 0:015 0:1576 0:015
￿W 0:3423 0:0289 0:3428 0:0292 0:2881 0:0266
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:0092 0:0038
￿MP ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:0562 0:0252
￿R 0:0354 0:0082 0:0351 0:0085 ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:9221 0:0863
￿a 0:8686 0:042 0:8774 0:043 0:8075 0:0601
￿b 0:8606 0:0345 0:8651 0:0359 0:8856 0:0327
￿G 0:9311 0:028 0:9328 0:0281 0:9464 0:0279
￿L 0:9776 0:0102 0:978 0:0102 0:8556 0:0728
￿I 0:9455 0:0259 0:9433 0:0265 0:9527 0:0226
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14Table 2: Prior speci￿cations and estimates of the structural parameters. The results for both
models are compared to those obtained in SW (2003)
Parameter Prior Speci￿cation
Distribution Type Prior Mean Prior se
S"(:) investment adjustment cost Normal 4 1:5
￿c consumption utility Normal 1 0:375
h consumption habit Beta 0:7 0:1
￿w calvo wages Beta 0:75 0:05
￿L labour utility Normal 2 0:75
￿p calvo prices Beta 0:75 0:05
￿e calvo employment Beta 0:5 0:15
￿w indexation wages Beta 0:75 0:15
￿p indexation prices Beta 0:75 0:15
capital utiliz. adjustment cost Normal 0:2 0:075
￿ ￿xed cost Normal 1:45 0:125
￿ smoothing parameter empirical Taylor rule Beta 0:8 0:1
r￿ lagged in￿ ation parameter Normal 1:7 0:1
ry lagged output gap parameter Normal 0:125 0:05
r￿￿ in￿ ation di⁄erential Normal 0:3 0:1
r￿y output gap di⁄erential Normal 0:0625 0:05
qr interest smoothing preference Normal 0:5 0:2
qy output gap preference Normal 0:5 0:2
qw wage in￿ ation preference Normal 0:5 0:2
Results from Posterior Results from Posterior Results SW (2003)
Parameter Maximization M1 (qw = 0) Maximization M2 (qw 6= 0) (re-estimated)
Mode se (Hessian) Mode se (Hessian) Mode se (Hessian)
S"(:) 5:1667 1:0009 4:994 1:0043 6:5814 1:0918
￿c 1:3667 0:2869 1:3637 0:2883 1:3545 0:2665
h 0:5135 0:0691 0:5165 0:07 0:5535 0:0696
￿w 0:8898 0:0151 0:8934 0:0149 0:7603 0:0503
￿L 0:6961 0:3554 0:7351 0:3656 2:1097 0:6077
￿p 0:8819 0:0097 0:8841 0:0105 0:9088 0:0109
￿e 0:5595 0:05 0:5667 0:0499 0:6011 0:0472
￿w 0:9067 0:0866 0:9126 0:0819 0:7677 0:1850
￿p 0:3452 0:0737 0:3905 0:0764 0:4226 0:099
capital utiliz. 0:1748 0:0741 0:177 0:0743 0:1775 0:0737
￿ 1:4887 0:1059 1:4778 0:1075 1:4365 0:1089
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:976 0:0112
r￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1:7 0:0997
ry ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:1265 0:0442
r￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:0977 0:0473
r￿y ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:1392 0:0322
qr 0:6309 0:1647 0:624 0:1652 ￿ ￿
qy 0:0401 0:0147 0:04 0:015 ￿ ￿
qw ￿ ￿ 0:269 0:1564 ￿ ￿
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15adjustment cost parameter is estimated to be lower ( 5:1667 and 4:994) than the baseline esti-
mated value of 6:5814, whereas the standard errors are similar. This suggests a higher elasticity
of investment with respect to an increase in the current price of installed capital of 1 percent
under M1 and M2. A strikingly higher value is obtained under M1 and M2 for the Calvo
wage parameter ￿w than in the baseline case (0:8898 and 0:8934 vs. 0:7603). The same conclu-
sion holds for the wage indexation parameter ￿w with 0:9067 and 0:9126 vs. 0:7677. Hence a
signi￿cantly higher wage stickiness and wage indexation is present whenever monetary policy is
assumed to behave optimally as is the case under M1 and M2, suggesting an average duration
of wage contracts of slightly more than two years. The reverse conclusion can be drawn from
estimates for the Calvo price ￿p and the price indexation parameter ￿p. These parameters are
signi￿cantly lower under the models characterized by optimizing monetary policy authorities,
yielding 0:8819 and 0:8841 for ￿p vs. the SW (2003) estimate of 0:9088 and 0:3452 and 0:3905
for ￿p vs. 0:4226. The former suggests a lower degree of price stickiness in the goods markets
under M1 and M2 compared to SW (2003) with an average duration of price contracts of two
years, which is very close to the average duration of the wage contracts, implying a similar de-
gree of stickiness in wages and prices under M1 and M2. The estimates of ￿p imply that price
indexation is lower under M1 and M2, and in line with the ￿ndings of Gali et al. (2001) for the
euro area where a low degree of backward-looking behaviour in the goods market is estimated.
Finally, the estimate of the labour utility parameter ￿L is considerably lower under the models
M1 and M2 (0:6961 and 0:7351) than under SW (2003) (2:1097)26.
3.3.2 Monetary Policy Preference Parameters
Table 2 also shows the parameter estimates of our main interest, i.e. the monetary policy
preferences in the two models M1 and M227. The estimates of the policy preferences for the
interest rate smoothing target qr and the output gap target qy are very similar for the two
alternative speci￿cations M1 and M2. In both cases the preference for interest rate smoothing
is estimated to be higher (0:6309 and 0:624) than the preference for output gap stabilization
(0:0401 and 0:04), while overall the main concern is still the in￿ ation target whose weight is
26Note that, as was the case in the original SW (2003), our estimates of this parameter did not appear to be
robust across speci￿cations either...
27Since in￿ation and the interest rates, both target variables, are measured on a quartely basis and the literature
occasionally considers target variables on a yearly frequency, the weights obtained from the estimates have to be
adjusted in order to make the results comparable to those in the literature which base their results on yearly
data. Therefore, from the viewpoint of these studies, the weight assigned to the output gap qy is not as small
as it seems at ￿rst sight. Taking this into account boils down to multiplying qy by a factor of 16 and converting
the in￿ation and the interest rate in the model to a yearly frequency . Hence, the values for qy would become
0:6416 under M1 and 0:64 under M2.
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16Table 3: Model comparison based on the marginal likelihood
M1 (qw = 0) M2 (qw 6= 0) SW(2003)
Laplace approximation ￿280:98 ￿282:39 ￿270:76
log
p(QTjMi)
p(QTjSW(2003)) i = 1;2 ￿10:22 ￿11:63 ￿
Modi￿ed Harmonic Mean ￿280:31 ￿281:68 ￿270:32
log
p(QTjMi)(1970:2￿1999:4)
p(QTjMi)(1970:2￿1980:2) i = 1;2;SW(2003) ￿266:82 ￿265:98 ￿246:41
Laplace approximation when qy = 0:005 ￿291:49 ￿290:79 ￿
Laplace approximation when qr = 0:2 ￿286:15 ￿340:58 ￿
normalized to one. However, when we investigate the importance of the output gap as a target
variable by calculating the marginal likelihood cost of decreasing the weight qy from 0:0401 to
e.g. 0:005, the importance attached to the output gap appears to be higher than the estimates
suggest28.
As the ￿rst line in Table 3 shows, a value of qy = 0:0401 is accomodated by a higher marginal
likelihood than whenever the weight is decreased to 0:005 (second last line in Table 3)29. In
addition, the impulse response dynamics of the target variables, which are shown in ￿gures 1
and 2 for the productivity shock and the price mark-up shock, respectively30, is di⁄erent when
we set qy = 0:005 (purple line) compared to the case where the weight is only slightly higher,
i.e. 0:0401 as in M1 (dark line). In both ￿gures, there is mainly a remarkable di⁄erence in the
dynamics of the output gap, which takes a longer time to return to equilibrium when qy = 0:005.
28It should also be noted that, in order to evaluate the relative importance of the components in the loss
function, their corresponding weights should be combined with the realtive volatility of the related variables.
Hence the weights per se are not su¢ cient to evaluate the importance of the alternative target variables, due to
the fact that the output gap concept we use in this study is a theoretical one.
29The marginal likelihood keeps deteriorating with the decrease in qy. For example, setting qy equal to 0:01
brings only a slight deterioration in the marginal likelihood (￿281:95). When qy = 0:001 the marginal likelihood
already drops to ￿335:96 and to ￿499:24 when qy = 0.
30Due to spatial limitations, we consider only the responses of the target variables to these two selected shocks.
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17Figure 1. Impulse response to productivity shock when qy = 0:005 vs. qy = 0:0401 (M1)
Figure 2. Impulse response to price mark-up shock when qy = 0:005 vs. qy = 0:0401 (M1)
When we decrease the weight assigned to the interest rate smoothing target (i.e. qr) to a
value of 0:2, the marginal likelihood also deteriorates as is shown in the last line of Table 3,
although this worsening is smaller than in the case where we lower the weight on the output
gap. Likewise, the impulse responses of the target variables to a productivity shock and a price
mark-up shock shown in ￿gures 3 and 4, respectively, do not change a lot when qr = 0:2 (purple
line) compared to the case where qr = 0:6309 as in M1 (dark line). Overall, the output gap
turns out to be more important as a target variable than is suggested by the estimates, since the
19
18deterioration in the marginal likelihood is worse and the dynamics of the target variables di⁄er
to a greater extent when models are re-estimated under the assumption that qy = 0:005 than
when qr = 0:2. Therefore, although the weight on the output gap is estimated to be small, the
statement that the output gap could be ignored in the loss function would be too strong given
the high e⁄ect a decrease in qy has on the marginal likelihood and the impulse responses.
Figure 3. Impulse response to productivity shock when qr = 0:2 vs. qr = 0:6309 (M1)
Figure 4. Impulse response to price mark-up shock when qr = 0:2 vs. qr = 0:6309 (M1)
In general, however, estimates of a small role for the output gap seem to ￿nd support in the
literature. Lippi and Neri (2005) for example estimate a very low value for qy for the euro area,
20
19although they use a di⁄erent output gap concept than the one in this study31 and assume that
monetary policy is conducted under discretion, which requires some caution in comparing the
results. Dennis (2003) likewise ￿nds an ignorable weight for the output gap for the US under
discretionary monetary policy, which is in analogy with Lippi and Neri (2005)32. S￿derlind
(1999), who also considers the case of commitment in estimating the policy preference parameters
and therefore provides a more appropriate comparison to our results, estimates a relatively high
value for qy in the framework of a standard loss function similar to (11). However, it is important
to keep in mind the fact that our output gap concept di⁄ers from the one used in the other studies,
which makes direct comparison of the results a bit troublesome. While Svensson (1999, 2002b)
argues for a case of gradual monetary policy where some weight should be given to stabilizing
the output gap, and therefore requires a less activist policy, ￿ndings in the literature mentioned
above for qy generally do not support this concept of ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting. On the other
hand, our experiments with the marginal likelihood costs and impulse responses do imply that
somehow monetary policy has considered the output gap as an important target variable.
Lippi and Neri (2005) and Dennis (2003) estimate a weight on the interest rate smoothing
component that is higher than the weight on the in￿ ation target, indicating a higher importance
attached to smoothing than to in￿ ation33. This is not the case in our study. Although our
estimates of qr show that interest rate smoothing is a relatively important target, in￿ ation
remains the main policy goal. From an economic point of view, this ￿nding is plausible and in
line with the statements that in￿ ation should be the main target variable in monetary policy￿ s
objective function. Moreover, Castelnuovo (2004) ￿nds through a calibration exercise in the
framework of discretionary monetary policy, a value for the interest rate smoothing weight close
to ours whenever forward-looking agents are added to the model. When agents are assumed to
be backward-looking only, this weight increases considerably up to a point where interest rate
smoothing becomes twice as important as the in￿ ation target. This leads Castelnuovo (2004)
to conclude that ￿nding an economically di¢ cult justi￿able high value for qr is probably due
to model misspeci￿cation by the omission of factors like forward-looking behaviour. Since the
model we consider includes forward-looking agents, our values of 0:6309 and 0:624 for qr are not
31Lippi and Neri (2005) describe the output gap as the deviation of output from a linear trend. On the
contrary, we assume that the output gap is the deviation of output from the natural output level in the absence
of nominal rigidities and the three i.i.d. cost-push shocks.
32S￿derstr￿m et al. (2003) show in their calibration exercise under discretion analogously a low concern for
output gap stabilization based on US data. See also Favero and Rovelli (2003) and Salemi (2001), who considers
the case of commitment to an optimal Taylor rule, for ￿ndings of a relatively low weight on output gap stabilization.
33S￿derstr￿m et al. (2003) show in their calibration exercise under discretion analogously a high importance
for interest rate smoothing based on US data.
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20surprising34. An intuitive explanation for this moderating e⁄ect of the presence of forward-
looking agents on the estimated weight assigned to the interest rate smoothing component in
the loss function can be given as follows35. Whenever (rational) agents are forward-looking,
their expectations will play a key role in the stabilization process of monetary policy and the
law of motion of the target variables. Thus current in￿ ation and output are determined by
past expectations, and current expectations will determine future in￿ ation and output. If the
economy is hit by a shock in the current period, requiring a change in the policy instrument rate
in order to stabilize the target variables, expectations will adjust accordingly and since agents
are rational they will take into account the fact that interest rate smoothing is a target variable
as well. Therefore a slow and persistent move in the interest rates is anticipated. Hence
expectations will have a stabilizing e⁄ect on current in￿ ation and output gap, which in turn
results in a slow and inertial behaviour in the interest rates. If agents were assumed to be
backward-looking, like in the case of Dennis (2006) and Ozlale (2003), this inertial behaviour in
the interest rates could be only taken into account by the assumption that smoothing receives a
high weight in the loss function of the central bank. If agents on the other hand are forward-
looking, interest rate inertia is attributed to the stabilizing e⁄ect of expectations, which results in
lower concern for the interest rate smoothing target. In addition to this explanation, we would
also like to point out that the commitment framework assumed in this study enforces this history
dependence more than would be the case if monetary policy were assumed to optimize under
discretion like in most studies previously mentioned. This suggests that if we would perform
a similar exercise under discretionary monetary policy, the estimated values for qr would be
probably higher. This would be an interesting extension and a topic for future research. Our
estimates of qr do not seem to support the argument of Svensson (2002b, 2003), that an interest
rate stabilization or smoothing component should not enter the loss function at all, since the
values obtained for the smoothing target are signi￿cantly higher than zero. However, as we
showed previously in this part, decreasing the value of qr does not lead to a very high loss in
terms of marginal likelihood, with a small change in the impulse responses compared to the case
where this parameter is freely estimated as is done in M1 and M2.
When nominal wage in￿ ation is introduced in the loss function of monetary policy, as in the
34In order to assess this positive link between the degree of backward-lookingness and the estimates of the
preference for interest rate smoothing in our model, we look at the correlation between the series on the in￿ation
indexation parameter ￿p and the interest rate smoothing preference parameter qr obtained from the markov chain
monte carlo draws. Based on these draws, we detect a positive correlation of around 0.3, which is in line with
the view of Castelnuouvo (2004).
35Castelnuovo (2004) provides a detailed explanation on this issue and quanti￿es the role played by forward-
looking agents in lowering the calibrated values of the weights on the interest rate smoothing component.
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21case of M2, this additional target receives a weight of 0:269, which suggests a lower importance
attached to wage in￿ ation stabilization with respect to the in￿ ation target. However, on the
basis of comparison of marginal likelihoods in Table 3, the M1 speci￿cation of the model where
qw = 0 is preferred over M2. Hence we can conclude that monetary policy is not concerned
about stabilizing nominal wage in￿ ation and that in￿ ation, interest rate smoothing and output
gap stabilization are its only targets.
Finally, we plot the prior and the posterior distributions of the parameters for model M1 in
￿gures A1-A3, which can be found in the Appendix. We apply the Metropolis-Hastings sampling
algorithm, as described in e.g. Bauwens et al. (2000), Gamerman (1997) and Schorfheide (2006),
based on 100:000 draws in order to derive the posterior distributions. Convergence is assessed
graphically by the Brooks and Gelman (1998) mcmc univartiate diagnostics for each individual
parameter and the mcmc multivariate diagnostics for all paramteres simultaneously36.
3.3.3 Optimal Rule in M1 vs. Empirical Taylor rule in SW (2003)
Since we include an i.i.d. measurement error in the nominal interest rates in order to correct
for mismeasurement in the observed data series, these errors, ￿R
t , take into account the non-
systematic part of the interest rate movements that are not implied by optimal monetary policy.
These errors can be compared to the monetary policy shocks, ￿R
t , included in the emprirical
Taylor rule (9) in SW (2003). The systematic part of the optimal policy rate implied by the
model M137 is plotted in ￿gure 5 (upper part) against the systematic part of the estimated Taylor
rule in SW (2003), i.e. as implied by equation (9) without the corresponding periodical monetary
policy shocks ￿R
t . As becomes clear from the ￿gure, the implied series on the systematic optimal
rule and the empirical Taylor rule show similar patterns. This similarity is not very surprising
since the empirical Taylor rule considered by SW (2003) mainly includes lagged variables. By
de￿nition, the optimal commitment rule, which is derived as an explicit reaction function from the
monetary policy optimization, responds to lagged endogenous variables. Hence, the backward-
looking characteristic that both rules have in common explains to a considerable extent the
similarity in ￿gure 5.
36 These graphs are available upon request.
37We focus on the smoothed series.
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Figure 5. Systematic part of instrument rule in SW (2003) vs. optimal rule in M1 (upper part)
and measurement errors M1 vs. monetary policy shocks SW (2003) (lower part)
The lower part of ￿gure 5 plots the series obtained for the measurement errors, ￿R
t , over the sample
period, i.e. the di⁄erence between the actual interest rate movements and the optimal policy rate
implied by model M1. The ￿gure also shows the monetary policy shocks, ￿R
t , implied by SW
(2003) that includes an empirical Taylor rule. The monetary policy shocks in the benchmark
SW (2003) model generally appear to be of a higher magnitude than the measurement errors in
model M1.
24
234 Model Comparison
In this part we compare and rank the models characterized by optimizing monetary policy
behaviour, i.e. the models M1 and M2, and the benchmark SW (2003) model in which monetary
policy is described by an empirical Taylor rule, based on their marginal likelihood values38
reported in Table 3. In a next step, we compare Bayesian impulse responses for selected shocks
under optimizing monetary policy authorities (M1) to those under SW (2003).
4.1 Marginal Likelihood Comparison
The marginal likelihood of a model can be represented as follows:
p(QT j Mi) =
Z
!
p(QT j !;Mi)p(! j Mi)d! (22)
where QT contains the observable data series, ! the vector of parameters and Mi the model
under consideration, in our case of three models i = 1;2 or SW(2003) . The likelihood function
p(QT j !;Mi) of the data series is conditional on the parameter vector ! and the model Mi.
p(! j Mi) is the prior density of the parameters conditional on the model. Since we use the same
dataset and the same initialization period in the estimation of the three models, the marginal
likelihood values shown in Table 3 are comparable39. As in Schorfheide (2000), we use the
Laplace approximation to approximate the marginal likelihood through the evaluation at the
posterior mode. Table 3 also reports the Modi￿ed Harmonic Mean for each model, obtained
through the markov chain monte carlo simulations, which does not di⁄er much from the Laplace
approximation. As pointed out by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2006) and Sims (2003), using
the same priors for alternative speci￿cations of a model can bias our choice towards one type of
speci￿cation. Given this potential pitfall in model comparison within Bayesian frameworks, we
correct for the e⁄ect of common priors by estimating and evaluating the models over the training
sample 1970:2-1980:2 as well, and substract accordingly the corresponding marginal likelihood
from the one obtained by estimation over the whole sample period 1970:2-1999:4. The results,
however, turn out to be qualitatively comparable to those reported in the ￿rst three lines in
Table 3.
Although from the table we can conclude that model M1 where qw = 0 ￿ts the data better
than model M2 where nominal wage in￿ ation is included as a target variable in the loss function,
38See Geweke (1998) and Schorfheide (2006) for a detailed discussion on the marginal likelihood function in
Bayesian estimation.
39However, it is important to keep in mind that comparison across models based on the marginal likelihood
does not guarantee a waterproof selection of the most suitable model, since the parameter space might be too
sparse (Sims, 2003).
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24both models perform relatively worse compared to the benchmark SW (2003) speci￿cation of the
model where monetary policy is characterized by an empirical Taylor rule only. This might be
due to the fact that, by introducing optimizing monetary policy into the models M1 and M2, we
impose a di⁄erent and more restrictive structure. This result could also indicate that monetary
policy was not optimal (under commitment) during the sample period. However, it is worth
to point out that in the SW (2003) description of monetary policy behaviour, the Taylor rule
includes ￿ve parameters, while there are only two monetary policy preference parameters to be
estimated in M1. Hence it is not very surprising that the SW (2003) model with more free
parameters to be estimated performs better than M1. Therefore, we re-estimate the SW (2003)
model with a slightly di⁄erent speci￿cation of the empirical Taylor rule (9). We consider the
following rule that responds to only the lagged in￿ ation rate and the lagged output gap:
^
Rt = ￿
^
Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
￿t + r￿(
^
￿t￿1 ￿
￿
￿t) + ry(
^
Yt￿1 ￿
^
Y
p
t￿1)
￿
(23)
so we drop the second part of reaction function (9) by setting r￿￿ = r￿y = 0. The marginal
likelihood of the SW (2003) model under this speci￿cation of the Taylor rule worsens to ￿301:08
(Laplace approximation), with ￿ = 0:8894, r￿ = 1:6454 and ry = 0:1291. Given that it might be
more appropriate to compare the optimal monetary policy model M1 to the SW (2003) model
with a rule like (23), the optimal monetary policy speci￿cation is clearly preferred by the data.
4.2 Bayesian Impulse Response Analysis
In this part we visualize the consequences of assuming optimizing monetary policy aurthorities
on the impact and the dynamics of the variables in the case of a supply shock (productivity
shock), a demand shock (equity premium shock) and a cost push shock (price-markup shock)
over a period of 20 quarters. We take the SW (2003) model which includes an estimated
policy reaction function as the benchmark case (green lines) and assess to which extent the
reactions of the variables di⁄er when monetary policy minimizes an intertemporal loss function
with one period loss as speci￿ed under model M1(dark lines)40. We look at the responses of
nine variables, i.e. output, consumption, in￿ ation, interest rate, wages, rental rate of capital,
employment, investment and the output gap. The solid lines are the mean impulse responses,
whereas the dotted lines are the 10% and the 90% posterior intervals.
40Since M1 performs relatively better than M2, we prefer to focus only on the impulse responses obtained
under M1. However, the impulse respones under M2 are, with the exception of responses to the equity premium
shock, very similar to those under M1.
26
25Figure 6. Productivity shock
Figure 6 shows the responses of the variables to a productivity shock. The interest rate, which
is the policy instrument and responsable for the main di⁄erences between the two alternative
model speci￿cations M1 and SW (2003), shows a slightly lower impact and gets more negative
(accommodative) around the third quarter under M1 as opposed to the benchmark SW (2003)
case. Hence consumption and investment both increase to a greater extent, resulting into a
higher increase in output and lower decrease in employment. The output gap does not become
negative, in contrast to the SW (2003) benchmark case, since monetary policy accommodates
the productivity shock more strongly. Although the impact on wages are higher, the rental rate
of capital shows a similar pattern in the two models. Finally, the initial e⁄ect on in￿ ation is
slightly more negative.
27
26Figure 7. Equity premium shock
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of the equity premium shock. The interest rate responds
more strongly to the equity premium shock and gets more positive (more activist policy) around
the third quarter, in contrast to the baseline model, which explains the stronger initial decline in
consumption, the weaker response of investment and hence employment, output and analogically
the output gap. The impact on both wages and rental rate of capital is much weaker and even
turns slightly negative. Therefore, in￿ ation responds negatively, however, the e⁄ect is very
small.
Figure 8. Price mark-up shock
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27Comparing the impulse responses to a price mark-up shock in ￿gure 8 to the benchmark case
yields the following conclusions. The impact and dynamics of the interest rate are similar to
the benchmark case. The initial decrease in investment is lower than the benchmark model,
followed by weak dynamics that are close to zero. In contrast to what we observe for SW (2003),
the impact of the shock on consumption is slightly positive, followed by smaller dynamics also
in this case. Hence, it is not surprising that output and employment are a⁄ected very weakly
in the initial period. The former reaches its lowest value around the tenth quarter, which is
still higher than in SW (2003). Note that, like in the case of the equity premium shock, the
output gap mimics here the behaviour of output too. This is logical since potential output is
not a⁄ected by these cost-push shocks and therefore the output gap follows the same dynamics
as output. Perhaps a bit surprising, in￿ ation shows very similar patterns in both models.
5 Implied Variances and Taylor Rules
In this part we adopt an alternative framework for comparing optimizing monetary policy behav-
iour to the empirical Taylor rule in the benchmark SW (2003)41. We derive both the unrestricted
optimal rule and the optimal coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule (9) for the SW (2003) model under
a standard ad hoc loss function of the type (11) where the weight parameters qy and qr are as-
signed the values obtained from the estimation of model M1, i.e. 0:0401 and 0:6309, respectively.
Accordingly, we compare these two rules, belonging to the optimal class of rules, to the estimated
Taylor rule in the benchmark SW (2003) model whose coe¢ cients are reported in Table 2. We
analyze the di⁄erences in the unconditional variances of the targets and the e¢ ciency frontiers
between the two alternative approaches towards monetary policy. The variances of the three
target variables, which are reported in Table 4, under the optimal Taylor rule are similar to those
implied by the unrestricted optimal commitment rule42. The values of the unconditional losses
(where qy = 0:0401 and qr = 0:6309) are therefore similar as well (0:095 in the case of the un-
restricted optimal commitment rule vs. 0:1035 in case of the optimal Taylor rule). The ￿nding
that the optimal Taylor rule approaches the unrestricted optimal commitment rule quite well is
not surprising, since both rules are history dependent. Therefore, we will focus on di⁄erences
41Since parameter estimates of M1 and the benchmark SW (2003) reported in tables 1 and 2 di⁄er, we prefer
to consider the analysis in this part only in the framework of SW (2003). This way we are able to correct for
the di⁄erences in the coe¢ cients of the structural equations between the two models. In addition, we check the
dynamics under the estimated model M1 and the benchmark SW (2003) model to which we attach the same
loss function and weights estimated for M1. The di⁄erences appear to be small, which provides an additional
justi￿cation for our focus on optimal monetary policy rules in SW (2003).
42Moreover, from the impulse response analysis, it appears that the dynamics under the optimal Taylor rule
are similar to those under the unrestricted optimal commitment rule.
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28Table 4: Variances of Target Variables and Unconditional Losses Optimal Rules and Estimated
Taylor Rule
Unrestricted Optimal Rule Optimal Taylor Rule Estimated Taylor Rule
variance ￿t 0:0582 0:0639 0:1227
variance (Yt ￿ Y
p
t ) 0:5511 0:5465 7:6577
variance (Rt ￿ Rt￿1) 0:0228 0:028 0:0185
Unconditional loss
[qy = 0:0401;qr = 0:6309] 0:095 0:1035 0:441
between the optimized coe¢ cients of (9) and their estimated counterparts.
As reported in Table 2, estimation of the SW (2003) speci￿cation of the model yields the
following coe¢ cients for the interest rate equation:
^
Rt = 0:976
^
Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ 0:976)
￿
1:7
^
￿t￿1 + 0:1265(
^
Yt￿1 ￿
^
Y
p
t￿1)
￿
(24)
+0:0977(
^
￿t ￿
^
￿t￿1) + 0:1392((
^
Yt ￿
^
Y
p
t ) ￿ (
^
Y t￿1 ￿
^
Y
p
t￿1))
= 0:976
^
Rt￿1 + 0:0408
^
￿t￿1 + 0:003(
^
Yt￿1 ￿
^
Y
p
t￿1)
+0:0977(
^
￿t ￿
^
￿t￿1) + 0:1392((
^
Yt ￿
^
Y
p
t ) ￿ (
^
Y t￿1 ￿
^
Y
p
t￿1))
The optimized coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule for the preference parameters in the loss function
qy = 0:0401 and qr = 0:6309 for the output gap and the interest rate di⁄erence, respectively, are
as follows43:
^
Rt = 0:9939
^
Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ 0:9939)
￿
25:66
^
￿t￿1 + 36:7669(
^
Yt￿1 ￿
^
Y
p
t￿1)
￿
(25)
+0:0576(
^
￿t ￿
^
￿t￿1) + 0:1791((
^
Yt ￿
^
Y
p
t ) ￿ (
^
Y t￿1 ￿
^
Y
p
t￿1))
= 0:9939
^
Rt￿1 + 0:1565
^
￿t￿1 + 0:2243(
^
Yt￿1 ￿
^
Y
p
t￿1)
+0:0576(
^
￿t ￿
^
￿t￿1) + 0:1791((
^
Yt ￿
^
Y
p
t ) ￿ (
^
Y t￿1 ￿
^
Y
p
t￿1))
Comparison of these optimized coe¢ cients in (25) to the estimated values in (24), shows that
there is a higher degree of interest rate persistence present when monetary policy follows the
optimal Taylor rule. Hence the optimal rule approaches more closely a di⁄erence rule. In
addition, the optimal coe¢ cients on lagged in￿ ation, lagged output gap and one-period di⁄erence
43These results are robust to changes in initial values. Therefore, we are quite con￿dent about the fact that
these values are globally optimal.
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29in the output gap are higher than the estimated coe¢ cients, which implies a more active interest
rate policy under the optimal approach towards monetary policy.
Finally, ￿gure 9 shows the e¢ ciency frontiers, i.e. the tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation and output
gap variability, in the case of an unrestricted optimal commitment rule and an optimal Taylor
rule of the type (9). The variance of in￿ ation is plotted on the horizontal axis against the
variance of the output gap on the vertical axis44. The frontiers are obtained by combining the
corresponding variances of output gap and in￿ ation for altering weights on the output gap qy in
the loss function. The combinations of in￿ ation and output gap variability for the estimated pair
of weights (qy = 0:0401,qr = 0:6309) are highlighted in the ￿gure for each rule. As noted earlier,
the ￿gure con￿rms that the e¢ ciency frontier under the optimal Taylor rule approaches the
e¢ ciency frontier under the unrestricted optimal rule closely. The combination of the variance
of in￿ ation and the output gap under the estimated Taylor rule (24), on the other hand, lies far
away from the e¢ ciency frontiers. This is mainly due to the fact that the variances of these
two target variables are considerably higher than the ones found for the optimal rules, with a
corresponding value of the loss function equal to 0:441, as reported in Table 4.
44Although the analysis would be more complete if we would include all target variables and therefore consider
the variance of the interest rate as well, which would require a plot in three-dimensional space, we prefer to focus
on only two of the three target variables in order to keep the analysis simple and in line with common practice in
the literature.
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Figure 9. E¢ ciency frontiers optimal rules
6 A Note on the Lagrange Multipliers and the Timeless
Perspective
Due to our assumption that optimal monetary policy is conducted under commitment, we are
dealing with a policy that is not time consistent, i.e. past commitments are ignored in the
initial period, which is re￿ ected by the fact that the values of the lagrange multipliers of the
forward-looking variables are set to zero at that point. Setting these initial lagrange multipliers
to zero implies that policy does not value the commitments she has made in the past. The
initial state of the economy is exploited, hence the time inconsistent nature of the policy. These
lagrange multipliers of forward-looking variables are considered to be the variables re￿ ecting the
values that are assigned to past commitments45. However, the concept of optimal policy under
timeless perspective introduced by Woodford (1999) addresses this potential time-inconsistency
problem by rewriting the optimization problem in such a way that the lagrange multipliers in
the initial period are not ignored46. In our estimation exercise performed above, we assume
45See Dennis (2001) for a detailed analysis on this interpretation. Other examples can be found in Jensen and
McCallum (2002), Blake and Kirsanova (2003) and McCallum and Nelson (2000).
46See also Svensson and Woodford (1999).
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31that the economy is at steady state in the initial period, i.e. the beginning of the sample period,
and the lagrange multipliers are set equal to zero. Hence we treat the ￿rst 40 quarters (1970:2-
1980:2) of our sample period as the initialization period preceding the estimations. This period
should be long enough to ensure us that the e⁄ects of the initial values at the beginning of the
estimation period become negligable. Accordingly, this should allow us to suggest that we do
incorporate the notion of optimal timeless policy in our estimation procedure47. In order to
check for this, we experiment with di⁄erent initial values at the start of the initialization period
(i.e. at time 1970:2) for the lagrange multipliers of the forward-looking variables only48. For our
suggestion that we successfully take into account the concept of optimal policy from a timeless
perspective to make sense, these changes in initial values should not lead to a (big) di⁄erence
in the estimation results since the e⁄ects of these initial values should have faded away by the
end of the initialization and the start of the estimation period49. The results obtained from
this exercise are almost identical to the original results reported in Tables 1 and 2 in section
3.3 and therefore the impulse responses are similar. This suggests that the results from our
estimation procedure are almost una⁄ected by changes in initial values thanks to a relatively
long initialization period. Additionally, we also check for sensitivity of the estimation results to
the length of the initialization period. For this purpose we decrease the size of the presample
gradually below 40 and re-estimate the model M1 twice, i.e. once by setting all initial values
equal to zero and once by setting the lagrange multipliers of forward-looking variables equal
to nonzero, for a given presample size. It turns out that, while decreasing the sample size,
the estimation results start to show higher di⁄erences once the presample reaches the size of
around 20 quarters and below. This suggests that, in order for the zero initial values of lagrange
multipliers to lose their e⁄ect, approximately 20 quarters are needed. Therefore, given our
presample choice of 40 quarters, our estimation results appear to be robust to the initial values
of the lagrange multipliers of forward-looking variables and the presample length. This justi￿es
the assumption that our results hold in the context of optimal policy approached from a timeless
perspective50.
Figure 10 plots the series of the lagrange multipliers (against time) of equations on forward-
47The reasoning that the optimal time inconsistent policy approaches closely the timeless perspective policy
after a su¢ ciently long period following the initial period of the optimization, is analogous to the one followed by
Juillard and Pelgrin (2005).
48Unfortunately, we do not know the exact initial values of the lagrange multipliers of the forward-looking
variables because these are not observable. Therefore we experiment with, admittedly arbitrary, values.
49We perform this experiment for model M1 only.
50To our knowledge, there is one empirical application to the timeless perspective solution. Juillard and
Pelgrin (2005) show a two-step method to estimate policy from a timeless perspective in a Bayesian framework
and apply it to a small open economy.
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32looking variables obtained after estimation of model M1. The implied values of the lagrange
multipliers of the real wages, in￿ ation and consumption appear to be higher in absolute value
as compared to the values of the lagrange multipliers of the other equations on forward-looking
variables that are very close to zero. Hence the values attached to past commitments by
monetary policy authorities are higher with respect to wages, in￿ ation and consumption than to
the other forward-looking variables. Put di⁄erently, the private sector expectations of wages,
in￿ ation and consumption are considered to be valued as relatively most important by monetary
policy under commitment51. Alternatively, the ￿gure suggests that the marginal contributions
of the individual constraints on wage and in￿ ation equations are relatively high. Therefore, the
nominal rigidities, i.e. wage and price rigidities, seem to impose an important constraint on the
model.
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Figure 10. Multipliers of the forward-looking variables obtained after estimation
51 The importance of these values, however, are described by the coe¢ cients in the explicit monetary policy
reaction function.
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337 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the preferences of optimizing monetary policy authorities in a DSGE
framework. Taking the Smets and Wouters (2003) model for the euro area as the benchmark
case, we look at the e⁄ects of the assumption that monetary policy is conducted optimally under
commitment. Accordingly, we estimate the preferences in the monetary policy objective function,
which is assumed to take a standard quadratic form, using Bayesian estimation techniques. In
doing this, we model the optimizing monetary authorities in two alternative ways. The ￿rst
model adopts a one period loss function that includes in￿ ation, the model-consistent output gap
and the one-period di⁄erence in the policy instrument. The second model includes an additional
wage in￿ ation component. The estimation results for the structural parameters under these two
model speci￿cations are compared to the results of the benchmark Smets and Wouters (2003)
model.
The estimate of the wage in￿ ation preference parameter in the monetary policy￿ s loss function
in our second alternative model does not turn out to be signi￿cant. This model performs relatively
worse by yielding a lower marginal likelihood than our ￿rst alternative model with three target
variables de￿ning the loss function. The results for the ￿rst model suggest a signi￿cant value
assigned to both the output gap and interest rate smoothing, in addition to the main in￿ ation
objective, in the monetary policy￿ s loss function.
A comparison of the estimated reaction function (generalized Taylor rule) of Smets and
Wouters (2003) to an optimized version of the same rule shows that the optimized coe¢ cient
on the lagged interest rate is higher than the estimated value, suggesting a more persistent rule
in the optimal approach towards monetary policy. The optimal coe¢ cients on lagged in￿ ation,
lagged output gap and the one-period di⁄erence in the output gap are also higher than the
estimated coe¢ cients, which indicates a more active optimal policy.
For the purpose of addressing the time-inconsistency problem that comes along with optimal
monetary policy conducted under commitment, where the issue arises because the initial values
of the lagrange multipliers on the equations on forward-looking variables are set equal to zero,
we precede our estimation procedure by an initialization sample that is long enough to ensure
that the e⁄ect of the initial values on the estimates wears out. Hence we are able to approach
the framework of optimal policy under timeless perspective of Woodford (1999) very closely.
There are a few points on which we would like to improve and extend this work in the future.
First of all, the results presented in this paper are conditional on the assumption that monetary
35
34policy performs optimally under commitment. Therefore, these results may change and lead
to di⁄erent conclusions if we would consider the alternative case of discretion. A simplifying
and perhaps naive assumption throughout our estimations is that of a constant loss function
over the sample period, implying stable preferences over the target variables along the period.
The idea of altering policy regimes over the period of our consideration (1980:2 - 1999:4) is
not unrealistic, which would require a split of the sample period in order to take changes in
monetary policy strategies in the euro area into account. Moreover, it would be interesting to
update our sample period and look at changes in monetary policy preferences brought about
by the introduction of the Euro. However, this would be a little troublesome for the moment
since our sample of the period after the launch of the Euro would be very short, which is the
main reason why we would like to leave this exercise for future work. We have restricted our
analysis to a case where the in￿ ation target is assumed to be a known constant. An interesting
extension would be to estimate the in￿ ation target together with the other parameters in the
model and allow for time-variation in this target. It could also be desirable to perform a similar
exercise for the US economy, which would allow us to assess di⁄erences in monetary policy
preferences in the euro area and the US. Finally, we did not consider the possibility of the
presence of any kind of uncertainty and/or possible deviations from the assumption that private
expectations are formed rationally. Therefore, it would be interesting to test the robustness of
our results to a certain degree of uncertainty concerning the structural parameters and/or the
underlying structural model, additionally taking into account the assumption that private agents
show learning behaviour.
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